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Since the reform of 30 years, China achieved great ecnonomic success; in it many 
fators have played an important role. This paper researches the influences on local 
economic development by China’s local government competition and agglomeration 
of foreign capital under the framwork of fiscal decentralization. 
In the persuit of endogenous economic growth theory, under the framwork of 
endogenous economic growth theory and the previous research result, it builds up a 
model which includs government expense and FDI. And derived stable economic 
growth route, and proves that stable economice growth is influenced by FDI and 
public expenditure structure. Stable economic growth rate maximize under an optimal 
public expenditure structure. However, fiscal decentralizaion and foreign capital 
agglomeration are not reflected in the constraction of the theoretical model. The 
analysis of influencial effect of government competion on foreign capital 
agglomeration and influence of fiscal decentralizaion on regional economic growth 
are mainly discussed in empirial part. The empiral analysis is divided in to three parts, 
the first part analyses the status of government competion and its influence. And the 
second part analyses the influencial effect of local government competetion on foreign 
capital agglomeration under the decentralization system. The third part analyses the 
influence of our local government competion and foreign capital agglomeration on 
economic growth. Because province was taken for unit under fiscal decentralization, 
in the empirical study, the analysis of economic growth is under the area classification 
of provinces. 
Under the deduction of theoretical model, we get a conclusion: stable economic 
growth rate is influenced by tax rate, foreign capital and public expenditure. FDI plays 
a positive role in promting the economic growth, the production expense to total 
expense ratio influence the economic growth rate positively first and then negatively. 
There is an opitimal financial expenditure structure which makes economic growth 
rate maximized. And the maximized financial expenditure structure is also related to 
capital-output elastisity, productive expenditure-output elastisity, non productive 















The empiracal research draws the following conclusion: first, FDI in China have 
positive spill over effect, our local government compet ficerely to arract FDI and fight 
for outside resources, in the view of local government financial expenditure, in order 
to attract FDI, lacal government decreased its technical input, which is bad for the 
local economic development in the long run; moreover, in oreder to show political 
achievements, local financial expenditure structure distorted.Second, our fiscal 
decentralizaion system could ensure high quality infrustructure construction and fiscal 
decentralizaion of power, which provides great incentive. However, the publice 
service imput which is very important for people’s welfare like education, healthcare 
is relatively not enough. Local government is obviously biased in arranging financial 
expenditure structure based on politial achievement evaluation, and thus leads to 
severe public expenditure structure distortion. Third, under the incentive of GDP as an 
achievement evaluation, provinces alike in economic status compet for the 
infrustructure input, and the increase in public expenditure promote the local 
economic development. However, the competition between local governments may 
leads to unreasonable financial expenditure, and exert heavy burden on local finance 
as well as lowering the efficiency of distribution of local public resources. Fourth, the 
combination of China’s political centralization and economic decentralization 
stimulate the activeness of local government to develop local economy to some 
extend, however, if the incentive mechanism seems too singlized, it may lead up to 
the persuit of the increase in GDP and neglecting people’s welfare. Fifth, China’s 
provincial GDP growth shows spillover effect, this is maybe because of industrial 
agglomeration in areas ajacent, and promote the mutual exchange of knowledge, 
technology, information and experienceb.after the reform of tax federalism 
significantly improve the effect of fiscal decentralizaion on local economic growth, 
however, if the incentive mechanism seems too singlized, it may lead up to the persuit 
of the increase in GDP and neglecting residents’ welfare. 
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